Personal possession is gaining floor once more throughout Europe as firms search extra management and aid from the pressures of public markets. Earlier than delisting, nevertheless, managers usually regulate reported earnings, generally to make the corporate seem cheaper or to easy the trail for a buyout. But as soon as these plans develop into public, markets usually reply favorably, viewing the transfer as a sign of future worth.
This shift towards going non-public started after the tech bubble burst within the early 2000s and accelerated following the 2008 monetary disaster, as corporations sought higher management and adaptability outdoors public markets. The enlargement of personal fairness corporations has bolstered the pattern, providing new avenues to restructure and lift capital away from the glare of public disclosure. In Europe, the place possession is commonly concentrated, voluntary delistings by leveraged buyouts (LBOs), administration buyouts (MBOs), or minority freeze-outs have develop into frequent.
On this submit, I share insights from my evaluation of 526 European corporations from 2005 to 2023. My purpose was to grasp how managers handle earnings within the 12 months earlier than these delistings and the way markets react as soon as these plans develop into public. This analysis, supervised by Wouter Creemers, PhD, CFA, received third prize within the 2024 CFA Society Belgium’s Grasp Thesis Awards.
Earnings Administration Earlier than the Exit
As voluntary delistings develop into extra frequent in Europe, consideration has turned to how managers deal with earnings earlier than these transactions. Accounting requirements reminiscent of IFRS and US GAAP permit a level of discretion, giving managers flexibility to affect reported outcomes by accounting decisions or actual enterprise choices.
This flexibility could make a agency’s efficiency seem higher or worse than it truly is, influencing choices and contracts that rely on monetary experiences. When these actions adjust to accounting requirements and replicate real enterprise exercise, they don’t seem to be fraudulent and might function a software in company restructuring.
Managers usually have interaction in downward earnings administration earlier than voluntary delistings. In LBOs, reducing reported earnings can assist scale back the takeover worth, whereas in MBOs, it may safe a extra favorable buyout worth for managers themselves. In each instances, earnings administration acts as a strategic software, serving to make delistings cheaper and smoother.
The important thing questions, then, are whether or not managers in Europe handle earnings downward earlier than voluntary delistings and whether or not markets acknowledge it earlier than or across the announcement.
Findings and Market Reactions
My research examines 526 European corporations — half that voluntarily delisted and half that remained public — utilizing accounting and market information from 2005 to 2023. Irregular present accruals had been estimated following the DeFond and Park (2001) mannequin to measure earnings administration. An occasion research utilizing inventory costs measured cumulative irregular returns (CARs) earlier than and round every announcement date. T-tests and peculiar least squares regressions had been then run to check the hypotheses.
The outcomes reveal clear patterns in corporations’ habits earlier than delisting bulletins:
- Corporations handle earnings downward utilizing damaging irregular present accruals within the 12 months previous to the voluntary delistings through LBOs and MBOs. This sample suggests managers might deliberately report decrease earnings to assist a decrease deal worth.
- These corporations expertise constructive cumulative irregular returns across the delisting announcement date, suggesting favorable market reactions to the voluntary delisting choice. For voluntarily delisting European corporations through LBOs and MBOs, downward earnings administration within the 12 months previous to the delistings is influenced by the voluntary delisting choices in addition to corporations’ ROA ratio, D/E ratio, age up till delisting, progress in income, MTB ratio, and the delisting years. In apply, stakeholders ought to issue within the affect these components have on monetary reporting practices to make higher knowledgeable strategic choices.
Though per prior analysis general, this research didn’t discover vital downward actions in inventory costs earlier than the bulletins.
Implications for Buyers and Policymakers
The outcomes counsel a number of sensible implications. Stakeholders ought to think about how voluntary delisting choices have an effect on monetary reporting practices earlier than bulletins, to make extra knowledgeable strategic choices and higher assess the reliability of economic statements.
Whereas the earnings administration noticed right here, whether or not by accounting decisions allowed underneath IFRS or actual exercise changes, is just not unlawful, it nonetheless displays opportunistic managerial habits in corporations getting ready to delist.
Regulators might want to strengthen disclosure requirements to make sure monetary experiences extra precisely replicate corporations’ efficiency earlier than delisting. Monetary analysts and advisors can incorporate the impression of the delisting choices on earnings administration into their evaluations and shopper suggestions.
Most earlier research on earnings administration previous to voluntary delistings deal with america and the UK. By inspecting European corporations, this analysis broadens the geographical scope of the literature and enhances the relevance of findings on earnings administration. The evaluation integrates views from accounting, company finance, company governance, and regulation to offer a extra complete view of earnings administration.
Taken collectively, the findings spotlight how managerial choices form monetary reporting and market reactions in European voluntary delistings, providing each a broader understanding of earnings administration and sensible insights for buyers and regulators.
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